Vol. 12, No. 4, December 1974 - "Strategy and Tactics"
(pp. 3 - 7)
William F. Pauly
Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to illustrate the application of geopolitical theory in a real world situation; thus, bridging the chasm between macro-geopolitics and applied strategy formulation. The theses of Halford Mackinder, referred to in this analysis as the Mackinder paradigm, are shown to have a relationship to the evolution of Soviet naval power.
(pp. 8 - 16)
Winston B. Clark; Major
U.S. Army
The crux of a geopolitical analysis is the establishment of the existing relationships between international political power and military capability and applying these to the geographical configuration of the area. Within this context there are two major points for consideration: (1) description of geographical factors as they affect political power and (2) formulation of a spatial context that encompasses interacting political elements. Perhaps the best contemporary example of a spatial overlap that exists among great power blocs is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation (Warsaw Pact) whose political divisions and interests span the length and breadth of Europe and Eurasia. Place/location, accessibility to resources, and distribution and qualitative use of these resources provide an appropriate framework perspective from which to view these organizations. As a backdrop for this discussion, a brief review of the global strategic views expressed by several recognized theorists during the last century is in order. These individuals placed great emphasis on the strategic unity of space organized within specific arenas of movement.
(pp. 17 - 23)
Dr. George Wiley
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
It has been over a century since Great Britain drifted into "our Crimean folly" undefined war with Russia. The causes of the fighting were disputed by contemporary statesmen and they have become increasingly obscure with the passage of time. The campaign itself, which consisted mainly of the siege and capture of Sebastopol, has been relegated to military history texts. There is one notable exception, the charge of the Light Brigade in defense of the British base at Balaclava. Whether final human blame for this colossal blunder can ever be established is highly questionable, for the officers involved despised each other and conducted themselves accordingly.2 Often disregarded in this issue of blame, however, are the conditions of climate and terrain. When the divisional commander over cavalry, the third earl of Lucan, questioned the fateful order to advance, "Attack, sir? Attack what? What guns, sir?"3 he was as much a victim of Crimean geography as was his commander-in-chief, Lord Raglan. An examination of this geography can provide additional understanding of those events that culminated in the charge of the Light Brigade.